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DUE PROCESS
N. Y. CONST. art. I, § 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
No person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Alliance of American Insurers v. Chu75
(decided April 2, 1991)
Plaintiffs, insurance companies who write property and casu-
alty policies, trade associations who represent these companies,
and individual policy holders, claimed that Chapter 503 of the
Laws of 197976 and Chapter 55 of the Laws of 198277
impermissibly diverted funds from a Property and Liability
Insurance Security Fund to the state's general fund. Plaintiffs
asserted that this violated the insurance companies' property right
guaranteed under article I, section 7 of the New York State
Constitution, 78 due process rights guaranteed under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution79 and
75. 77 N.Y.2d 573, 571 N.E.2d 672, 569 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1991), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 803 (1985).
76. Act of July 10, 1979, ch. 503, 1979 N.Y. Laws 1042 (McKinney).
77. Act of Apr. 12, 1982, ch. 55, 1982 N.Y. Laws 85 (McKinney).
78. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7.
79. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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contract rights also guaranteed under the United States
Constitution. 80 The defendants are the Commissioner of Taxation
and Finance, the Superintendent of Insurance and the
Commissioners of the State Insurance Fund. The New York
Court of Appeals, in a five to two decision, reached only the
issue of plaintiffs' property interest and held that the insurance
companies did have a property interest in the fund. The court
then held that Chapters 503 and 55 are invalid to the extent that
they deprived the fund of earnings attributable to the insurance
companies.
In 1947, the New York State Legislature created the Motor
Vehicle Liability Security fund, which promised payment on mo-
tor vehicle liability claims if the insurance company became in-
solvent. Under section 333 of New York's Insurance Law, 81 the
-fund called for insurance companies, who granted motor vehicle
liability policies in New York State, "to file quarterly returns
stating the amount of net direct written premiums charged on
such policies and to make contributions to the fund based on a
percentage of such premiums." ' 82 Section 333 further provided
that "[c]ontributions were to cease when the net value of the fund
equaled 15% of the outstanding claim reserves incurred under
policies protected by the fund, and would resume only if the net
value of the fund dropped below that level due to the payment of
claims."' 83 Lastly, section 333 promised that the fund "shall be
separate and apart from any other fund and from all other state
moneys, and the faith and credit of the state of New York is
pledged for their safekeeping. ' 84 In 1969, the state legislature
decided to expand the use of the fund to other areas of insurance
80. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No state shall... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ).
81. Act effective Apr. 11, 1947, ch. 801, 1947 N.Y. Laws 1477
(McKinney).
82. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 579, 571 N.E.2d at 674, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 366 (citing Act effective Apr. 11, 1947, ch. 801, 1947 N.Y.
Laws 1477, 1478-79 (McKinney)).
83. Id. (citing Act effective Apr. 11, 1947, ch. 801, 1947 N.Y. Laws
1477, 1479 (McKinney)).
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by enacting section 334 of the Insurance Law. 85 Section 334
called for new insurance companies to contribute to the fund,
now entitled "Property and Liability Insurance Security Fund,"
until it reached $200 million. Section 334(4) also provided that
once the target amount of $200 million was met, contributions
would not have to resume until the fund went below $150
million. 86 Similarly this provision "includ[ed] the State's pledge
of faith and credit for the fund's safekeeping and the requirement
that the fund be kept separate and apart from other funds and
other State moneys." 87
Expanding the fund to other areas of insurance created two dis-
tinct categories of fund moneys. The first is the so-called
"section 333" fund money, which was derived from the motor
vehicle insurance contributors. The second is the so-called
"section 334" fund money, which was funded by the non-motor
vehicle insurance contributors. With regard to "section 334"
fund money, the 1969 legislation called for any income derived
from "section 334" moneys to be "returned to the contributors
or credited against future contributions." 88
By 1973, the fund had reached $200 million. The state
legislature then decided to amend section 33389 to allow income
accrued from the "section 333" fund to be diverted to the state's
general fund as opposed to being returned back into the fund.
"Section 334" fund money while also amended 90 did not call for
any diverting of funds to the state's general fund.
In 1979, the state legislature again amended section 334.91 The
legislature, as articulated in chapter 503, provided that "section
334" income earned from the fund would no longer be returned
85. Act of Apr. 21, 1969, ch. 189, 1969 N.Y. Laws 233 (McKinney).
86. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 580, 571 N.E.2d at 675, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 367 (citing Act. of Apr. 21, 1969, ch. 189, 1969 N.Y. Laws
233, 235-36 (McKinney)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 581, 571 N.E.2d at 675, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
89. Act of June 22, 1973, ch. 861, § 10, 1973 N.Y. Laws 1625, 1632
(McKinney).
90. Id. § 11, at 1633.




et al.: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
DUE PROCESS
or credited to the non-motor vehicle contributors. Also, pursuant
to chapter 503 of the Laws of 1979, the legislature stated that
when the combined moneys of "section 333" and "section 334"
fund money exceeded $240 million, after payment of claims and
administrative expenses, the excess of money would be credited
to the state's general fund.
In 1982, the legislature, pursuant to chapter 55 of the Laws of
1982,92 transferred $87 million from the corpus of the fund to
the state's general fund. 93 Chapter 55 did provide, however, that
if the fund needed money to reimburse insolvent insurer claims,
then money from the original transfer would be returned to the
fund.
In 1985, the same plaintiffs in the case at bar, challenged the
constitutionality of section 92 of chapter 55 of the Laws of
1982. 94 In American Insurers Ass'n v. Chu,95 the plaintiffs
asserted that the transfer of funds created the possibility that
additional funds might be required in the future to maintain the
statutory surplus of $150 million. The court of appeals dismissed
the plaintiffs' complaint as being premature because "the issue
presented for adjudication involve[d] a future event beyond con-
trol of the parties which may never occur." '9
6
The justiciability issue was eliminated in 1988 when the net
value of the Property and Liability Insurance Security Fund fell
below the $150 million requirement, thus prompting the in-
surance companies' obligation to resume contributions. This re-
sult led to the present challenge by the plaintiffs. In the present
case, however, the plaintiffs not only challenged the constitu-
tionality of chapter 55, but also similarly challenged the consti-
92. Act of Apr. 12, 1982, ch. 55, 1982 N.Y. Laws 85 (McKinney).
93. The state's general fund, pursuant to Chapter 55, also received $50
million from the Aggregate Trust Fund, $190 million from the State Insurance
Fund and $67 million from Stock Workmen's Compensation Security Fund.
American Insurer, 77 N.Y.2d at 583, 571 N.E.2d at 677, 569 N.Y.S.2d at
369 (citing Act of Apr. 12, 1982, ch. 55 § 92, 1982 N.Y. Laws 85, 125
(McKinney)).
94. See American Ins. Ass'n v. Chu, 64 N.Y.2d 379, 476 N.E.2d 637,
487 N.Y.S.2d 311, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 803 (1985).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 385, 476 N.E.2d at 639, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
1992] 849
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tutionality of chapter 503. 97
While the plaintiffs raised several federal and state constitu-
tional claims, the court addressed only whether sections 333 and
334 of the state's Insurance Law created a property right in the
Property and Liability Insurance Security Fund such that it would
prohibit the state from diverting money from that fund. The court
concluded that the contributors did have a property right in the
fund which prohibited the legislature from diverting money from
the Property/Casualty Insurance Security Fund to the state
fund. 98 The court did not specify under what state constitutional
provision their holding was based, but explained that their
"decision rests on the constitutionally based protection against
legislative interference with vested rights. . . .,99
The court's holding was based on several factors derived from
the statutory scheme of sections 333 and 334 of the state's
Insurance Law. First, the court found that section 334 explicitly
gave the contributors a right to the income earned from their
contributions. 10 Second, the statute also assured the contributors
that the contributed money would only be used for the benefit of
the fund and not for other purposes.101 Third, the court noted
that section 333 permitted expenditures only for insolvent
insurance company claims and administrative expenses related to
the management of the fund. 102 Lastly, the court believed that it
97. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 578, 571 N.E.2d at 674, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 366.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 586, 571 N.E.2d at 679, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 371. Judge Hancock,
in a dissenting opinion, claimed that the majority decision is a return to the
"Lochner era" of the judiciary imposing its own view of substantive due
process when invalidating regulatory legislation. Id. at 604, 571 N.E.2d at
690, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 382 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
The majority opinion denied this claim, stating that "[w]e are not
substituting our judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom of its
actions. We are simply giving meaning to the words used by the Legislature."
Id. at 586, 571 N.E.2d at 679, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
100. Id. at 587, 571 N.E.2d at 679, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 588, 571 N.E.2d at 680, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 372.
850 [Vol 8
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would be unfair for the contributors to pay again into the fund
due to the state's diverting of money from that fund.103
According to the court:
All of these limitations established by the Legislature dictate that
the contributions made by plaintiffs were not to become State
moneys to do with as it wished. Instead, the statutory scheme,
viewed as a whole, created in the State obligations to preserve
the fund and to use its assets and earnings only for the narrow
purposes set forth. 104
The court emphasized that its holding was limited to invalidat-
ing only sections 333 and 334 of the state's Insurance Law affect-
ing the Property and Liability Insurance Security Fund.
Therefore, this decision does not affect other similarly con-
structed statutory schemes. 105 Moreover, the court determined
that the contributors only have a property right as to past contri-
butions and income earned from such money. Therefore, the
court stated that the legislature may extinguish that property right
with respect to future contributions. 106
The dissent, authored by Judge Hancock and joined by Judge
Titone, disagreed with the majority's premise.107 The dissent
argued that "none of the several statutes pertaining to the fund,
taken separately or in combination contains a basis for a finding
of any promissory 'property right.' ' 108 The dissent also
contended that a prior court of appeals decision, Methodist
Hospital v. State Insurance Fund,109 presented a "virtually
identical constitutional attack on one of two statutes at issue
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Mr. Carey's Bad Example Made Worse, N.Y. imes, April 20,
1991, at 22 (since Mario Cuomo became governor, the state has borrowed a
total of more than $1.6 billion of funds contributed by insurers, policyholders
and bond buyers).
106. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 589, 571 N.E.2d at 680, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 372.
107. Id. at 593, 571 N.E.2d at 683, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 375 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
108. Id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
109. 64 N.Y.2d 365, 476 N.E.2d 304, 486 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1985), appeal
dismissed, 474 U.S. 801 (1985).
1992]
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In Methodist Hospital, the court of appeals upheld the transfer
of $190 million from the state's insurance fund to the state's
general fund 111 because section 76 of New York's Worker's
Compensation Law did not grant the contributors a property
interest in the fund's surplus. 112 The majority, in American
Insurers, distinguished Methodist Hospital because the former
had a property interest and the latter did not. 113 The majority
explained that the state transfer of funds in Methodist Hospital
did not disturb any rights or obligations of the contributors. The
majority further noted that in Methodist Hospital, the state's
diverting of funds did not require the contributors to resume
contributions.
Judge Hancock asserted, however, that Methodist Hospital is
indistinguishable and thus the plaintiffs do not have a property
right to the fund. The judge maintained that each fund is estab-
lished and regulated by the state and thus subject to the state's
discretion on how those funds will be managed.
While not mentioned or analyzed in American Insurers, the
creation of a property right would arguably implicate article I,
section 6 of the New York State Constitution 114 whereas the state
legislature would be prohibited from passing a statute that would
retroactively deprive a contributor of his or her property without
due process of law. In this case, a contributor's due process
rights may be couched in terms of contractual rights that emanate
from a statute. In Patterson v. Carey,115 the court of appeals
stated that "the State may not deprive a party to a contract of an
essential contractual attribute without due process of the law."
The court added that "'[d]epriving an owner of property of one
110. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 594, 571 N.E.2d at 683, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 375 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
111. Methodist Hospital, 64 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 476 N.E.2d at 306, 486
N.Y.S.2d at 907.
112. Id. at 377, 476 N.E.2d at 310, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
113. American Insurtrs, 77 N.Y.2d at 578, 571 N.E.2d at 679, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 371.
114. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
115. 41 N.Y.2d 714, 363 N.E.2d 1146, 395 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1977).
[Vol 8
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of its essential attributes, is depriving him of his property within
the constitutional provision' and, absent due process, works an
impermissible 'forfeiture of the right given by the contract.'1 116
This view of protecting a party's due process rights by
compelling the state to adhere to original terms set forth by
statute was echoed in the case at bar. In American Insurers, the
court of appeals observed that "[t]he integrity of the State
government, upon which the public is entitled to rely, requires, at
the very least, that the State keep its lawfully enacted
promises. "117
Similarly, the United States Constitution prohibits states from
taking a person's property without due process of law. 118 In
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 119 the United States
Supreme Court noted that "[p]roperty interests . are not cre-
ated by the Constitution." ' 120 In addition, the Court stated that
"they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law . . ",121 While a party may have a property
right under state law, the state legislature may still constitution-
ally impair that right subject to the constraints of the Federal
Constitution's Contract Clause.122 In United States Trust Co. of
New York v. New Jersey,123 the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n
general, a statute is itself treated as a contract when the language
and circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private
rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the State." 124
The Court further noted that "the Contract Clause does not pro-
hibit the States from repealing or amending statutes generally, or
116. Id. at 720, 363 N.E.2d at 1151, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 416 (quoting People
et rel. Manhattan Sav. Inst. of City of New York v. Otis, 90 N.Y. 48, 52
(1882)).
117. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 577, 571 N.E.2d at 673, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 365.
118. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
119. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
120. Id. at 577.
121. Id.
122. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, Cl. 1.
123. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
124. Id. at 17 n.14.
1992]
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from enacting legislation with retroactive effects." 125 In order
for an impairment to be held constitutional, the state must prove
"that impairment was both reasonable and necessary to serve the
admittedly important purposes claimed by the State.", 126 To de-
termine whether the impairment is permissible, the Court stated
that two conditions must be met: First, the parties must have
failed, at the time of contracting, to foresee the possibility of
changed circumstance; second, the state must have no other al-
ternative but to impair the contract.
Turning to the facts in the present case, it is likely that the
United States Supreme Court, as was concluded by the court of
appeals, would protect the contributor's property rights in the
fund from contractual impairment by the state. This conclusion is
based on the state's failure to prove that they have no other al-
ternative but to impair the contract. Here, the court of appeals
noted that "[t]he only justification the State can offer for the
breach of its commitment is the enhancement of the State's gen-
eral revenues." ' 127 Without more, the Supreme Court could con-
clude that the state has other options to raise revenues such as in-
creasing taxes or reducing allocations in other programs.
Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis 128
(decided May 7, 1991)
See the discussion of this case under FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND THE PRESS. 129 The court held that the petitioner was
given proper notice and that the proceedings before the Crime
Victims Board were regular. 130
125. Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 29.
127. American Insurers, 77 N.Y.2d at 588-89, 571 N.E.2d at 680, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 372.
128. 77 N.Y.2d 713, 573 N.E.2d 541, 570 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1991), cert.
granted and vacated, 112 S. Ct. 859 (1992).
129. See infra notes 423-58 and accompanying text.
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